Smoot-Hawley, Redux?

It is conventional wisdom that our current crisis -- even if it blossoms into World Depression II (Michael Kinsley's phrase) -- won't be as bad as the Great Depression.

After all, policy-makers have many more tools at their disposal, and we won't make the same mistakes (worrying about balancing the budget, restricting unemployment relief, and passing the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.)

The last of these -- Smoot-Hawley -- is seen as a symbolic, and prolonging, but not causing the Depression. While tariffs had long played a role in US economic development, Smoot-Hawley (ultimately passed in 1930) had the misfortune of being debated on the front pages of New York newspapers while the 1929 Crash was occurring. As one observer at the time said, the Act "'intensified nationalism all over the world.'"

But the continued threat of terrorism -- fueled by theocratic leaders that wish to 'return to an earlier age' -- may have some of the same effects as Smoot-Hawley. This morning's attack in Pakistan on a visiting cricket team from Sri Lanka will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on cultural exchanges in that part of Asia. (The Sri Lankans were actually replacing an Indian team that cancelled after last year's Mumbai attacks.)

Does "sports tourism" have a material effect on international economic activity? Of course not. But the symbolic effect of 'closing off' parts of the global economy may have some psychological effect that, like Smoot-Hawley, make take years to overcome.

And that doesn't even begin to account for the potential global ramifications of the first failed state with nuclear weapons.

The Spring of 1940

With news that Lehman Brothers hangs on the brink of bankruptcy, one is reminded of the words of novelist Graham Greene in The End of the Affair. Writing (with the benefit of hindsight, in 1950), of the Spring of 1940, he wrote:

the spring like a corpse was sweet with the smell of doom.

The Politics of Glory

Phil Rizzuto, who was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame on February 27, 1994, by the Veterans' Committee, died today at the age of 89. Rizzuto was the oldest living HoFer, and his candidacy to the Hall was advanced (according to rumor) by Ted Williams, who declared that "the Red Sox would have won all those pennants if [Rizzuto] had played in front of me[i.e., left fielder Williams]"

By coincidence, over the past few days I have re-read Bill James' "The Politics of Glory: How Baseball's Hall of Fame Really Works" (which was apparently re-published in 1995 as "Whatever Happened to the Hall of Fame?: Baseball, Cooperstown, and the Politics of Glory"); both titles are a mouthful, but improve on James' 1989 work, "This Time Let's Not Eat the Bones."

James' work was clearly inspired by the controversy in the early 1990s about whether Rizzuto should, in fact, be a Hall-of-Famer. Rizzuto's candidacy was clearly aided by the election (also by the Veterans' Committee, of Bobby Doerr (James gives Ted Williams some credit towards getting his teammate Doerr into the HoF on page 142), and, more importantly, Pee Wee Reese. (To be fair, Rizzuto lost the better part of three years to WWII, which would have helped his career numbers be closer to the HoF 'median' for shortstops.)

James' book intersperses a history of the institution -- and its status apart from MLB -- with the voting constituencies, and more important, an analysis of the HoFers who clearly are at the margin -- Rizzuto (who was on the outs at the time James initially wrote; Don Drysdale; Bill Mazeroski (out at the time; subsequently elected); Ron Santo (still on the outside, looking in); Joe Torre (out then and now, although probably in now thanks to his managerial career; much closer to being in as a player than currently appreciated); George Davis (now in); Jim Kaat (out -- then and now); and Minnie Minoso (not considered a 'true' Negro Leaguer, but lost a significant amount of his career thanks to the color line).

Like all of James' writing, the book is witty and thought-provoking; however, in a re-reading some 14 years after publication, what is truly amazing is the changes in the how we view the game -- James still refers to 'Triple Crown' statistics even though they have been replaced (subsequently, and as a result, in part, of James' work) with stats such as OBP, OPS, and the like.

There will be more on the Hall of Fame here shortly, but the original is a good read, albeit dated (written before Michael Lewis' Moneyball, and shortly after Ken Burns' Baseball; the paperback undoubtedly resolves some of the typos and other editing errors that distract from a compelling narrative.

The End of an Era

The short, unhappy life (or at least Red Sox career) of Willie Mo Pena is in its apparent death throes as the outfielder has cleared waivers, and can be traded to any other team before the end of the month. With the signing of Bobby Kielty to a minor league deal -- but one that allows him to opt out if not promoted within a week -- the writing was on the wall for Pena.

The Sox apparently tried to move Pena at the trading deadline, but could find no takers. Now, the outfielder will probably attract a prospect (read: unknown talent) or two, at most. Although in possession of unquestioned power, Pena never found a place in Boston; he is playing tonight in a likely attempt to 'showcase' his ability.

Although the final chapter will not be set unless and until Pena moves, here's the way it looks tonight:

Pena
2006 24 BOS AL  84G  276AB   36R   83H  15 2B  2 3B  11HR   42RBI   20BB  90K  .301BA  .349OBP  .489SLG
2007 25 BOS AL  68G  147AB   17R   32H   8 2B  1 3B   5HR   16RBI   13BB  55K  .218BA  .290OBP  .388SLG

Arroyo:
2006 29 CIN NL  14W  11L  35G  3CG   1SO   240.7IP  222H   98R   88ER  31HR   64BB  184K 3.29ERA 1.188WHIP
2007 30 CIN NL   4W  12L  23G  1CG   0SO   141.0IP  157H   83R   74ER  14HR   48BB   99K 4.72ERA 1.454WHIP
In 2006, Arroyo also finished 23rd in MVP voting, and was an All-Star.

"Enhanced Interrogation"

Andrew Sullivan's must-read post yesterday on 'enhanced interrogation' techniques has resonated throughout the blogosphere, and for good reason. The very euphemism -- "enhanced interrogation" -- was apparently coined in the late 1930s by a Nazi party that was concerned (at least at that time) about public appearances:

Other translations include "intensified interrogation" or "sharpened interrogation". It's a phrase that appears to have been concocted in 1937, to describe a form of torture that would leave no marks, and hence save the embarrassment pre-war Nazi officials were experiencing as their wounded torture victims ended up in court. The methods, as you can see above, are indistinguishable from those described as "enhanced interrogation techniques" by the president.

To his credit, Sullivan has been writing about torture for some time, and taking on the Administration's position. His post focuses on a post-WWII trial in Norway, wherein 3 Nazis were convicted for the war-crimes of 'enhanced interrogation', aka torture.

Sullivan concludes:

Critics will no doubt say I am accusing the Bush administration of being Hitler. I'm not. There is no comparison between the political system in Germany in 1937 and the U.S. in 2007. What I am reporting is a simple empirical fact: the interrogation methods approved and defended by this president are not new. Many have been used in the past. The very phrase used by the president to describe torture-that-isn't-somehow-torture - "enhanced interrogation techniques" - is a term originally coined by the Nazis. The techniques are indistinguishable. The methods were clearly understood in 1948 as war-crimes. The punishment for them was death.

Russia's War

For the last few weeks, news out of Europe has been dominated by the questions surrounding the death of Alexander V. Litvinenko, the former K.G.B. agent, who was apparently poisoned by exposure to polonium 210. Coincidentally, I stumbled upon Richard Overy's "Russia's War: A History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-1945," and was reminded that intrigue has a long and tragic history in both the Soviet Union and Russia.

Overy's book has two main strengths: first, he is the beneficiary of the post-Cold War release of materials from the Soviet files; second, Overy has the confidence and the command of the subject to write briefly - the whole work is barely 300 pages. (I should also note that Overy's book was apparently a follow-on piece to a series of documentaries of the same title produced in 1994-95. I am trying to locate the series.)

Overy takes advantage of the new primary source materials to refute certain of the pieces of WWII conventional wisdom about Stalin and the Russian effort in the war. The infamous Ribbentrop/Molotov accord in 1939 is blamed not on Stalin's "treachery", but rather on the German desire to secure its flank to be able to fall upon France and the Low Countries to the West. ("[Stalin] could as easily made a pact with the imperialist West as he could with fascist Germany...Yet the German alliance was neither expected nor sought in 1939. Only when the German offer was on the table did it prove irresistible."(p.50))

Likewise, the collapse of the Soviet defense in the face of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 is usually attributed to the hollowing out of the Soviet officer corps in the wake of the purges of the late 1930s. While Overy does not flinch in describing the torture or worse inflicted on many senior officials who rose to prominence under Stalin, he attributes the German success in the summer of 1941 to Stalin's own failure to acknowledge Hitler's willingness to attack his erstwhile ally, especially in light of the military difficulties that Stalin recognized the Germans would face. It was not that the Soviet military professionals did not predict the coming storm - it was that they were not willing to risk life and limb by contradicting own Stalin's view that the German/Soviet pact was built for the long-term.

Winston Churchill's reputation also suffers under Overy's pen. In a telling detail, Stalin in the 1943 conference in Teheran pushes both Churchill and FDR to commit to a specific timetable for the Overlord (Normandy) invasion that would relieve some of the pressure off the Soviet army. While Stalin pulls on his pipe and waits in silence for an answer, FDR is seen winking at Stalin, leaving Churchill outnumbered and, eventually, forced to commit to a Spring 1944 landing. More telling, Overy reports that it was Churchill in Moscow in 1944, and not FDR in Yalta or Truman in Potsdam in 1945, that agreed to the divvying up of Europe into spheres of influence. Although sourced to Churchill's own memoirs, Overy states that the British PM's list of influence (90% Soviet influence in Romania; 50% in Hungary and Yugoslavia; 75% in Bulgaria, etc.), "makes a mockery of [Churchill's] later credentials as a Cold Warrior, just as it compromised his relations with Roosevelt. It amounted to a virtual acceptance of more than Stalin could have hoped for in Eastern Europe." (p.251-52)

While Churchill is a bit player, and FDR even less so, the main focus of the book is on Stalin, his key generals, and the contradictory nature of his rule. Stalin is seen as a master manipulator (he would always sit to the side at meetings, and never preside (p.16)), and unafraid to use terror and betrayal. But as a Georgian, he was nonetheless ruthless in crushing nationalist uprisings throughout the Soviet empire. Likewise, a committed Communist, at the moment of crisis in 1942, he allowed to revival of the Russian Orthodox Church, and invoked the names of Russian (i.e., pre-Revolutionary) heroes as part of the war effort.

There have been several popular histories of the Eastern Front over the past few years, including two by Antony Beevor ("Stalingrad" and the "Fall of Berlin 1945.") Overy's book is every bit as readable, and offers a new perspective on Stalin's side of the war. A quick read, but well worth it.